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In games with incomplete information, conventional hierarchies of belief are in-
complete as descriptions of the players’ information for the purposes of deter-
mining a player’s behavior. We show by example that this is true for a variety of
solution concepts. We then investigate what is essential about a player’s infor-
mation to identify behavior. We specialize to two player games and the solution
concept of interim rationalizability. We construct the universal type space for ra-
tionalizability and characterize the types in terms of their beliefs. Inﬁnite hierar-
chies of beliefs over conditional beliefs, which we call ∆-hierarchies, are what turn
out to matter. We show that any two types in any two type spaces have the same
rationalizable sets in all games if and only if they have the same ∆-hierarchies.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Games with incomplete information are indispensable tools in modern economic anal-
ysis. John Harsanyi, in a series of papers (Harsanyi 1967–68), introduced the Bayesian
game framework which is now the nearly universally adopted model of strategic be-
havior under incomplete information. Harsanyi himself observed that prior to his in-
novation, the basic theory of incomplete information was almost non-existent despite
the obvious wealth of potential applications. The problem seemed to arise at the most
fundamental level: how to formalize a player’s beliefs and higher-order beliefs in a man-
ageable way.
“It seems to me that the basic reason why the theory of games with incom-
plete information has made so little progress so far lies in the fact that these
games give rise, or at least appear to give rise, to an inﬁnite regress in recip-
rocal expectation on the part of the players .... In such a game player 1’s
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strategy choice will depend on what he expects (or believes) to be player 2’s
payoff functionU2, as the latter will be an important determinant of player
2’sbehaviorinthegame. ...Buthisstrategychoicewillalsodependonwhat
heexpectstobeplayer2’sﬁrst-orderexpectationabouthisownpayofffunc-
tion U1. Indeed player 1’s strategy choice will also depend on what he ex-
pects to be player 2’s second-order expectation—that is, on what player 1
thinks that player 2 thinks that player 1 thinks about player 2’s payoff func-
tionU2. ...and so on ad inﬁnitum.”
To completely describe an incomplete information environment, one must specify
the players’ inﬁnite hierarchies of belief, and this appeared intractable. Harsanyi’s solu-
tion was based on the compact model of information that is now called a type space.
Suppose the players are uncertain about which events in some set Ω of states of the
world hold. Typically Ω will represent the possible payoff functions in the game. In a
type space over Ω, all strategically relevant aspects of a player’s information about Ω are
encapsulated in a single variable, referred to as the player’s type. Each player has a set of
possible types Ti, and for each type ti there is speciﬁed a belief µi(ti) about the underly-
ing payoffs and the types of the other players in the game. This structure is quite simple
formally, and yet within this simple model are embedded the complex hierarchies of
belief that seemed to produce inﬁnite regress. Here is a simple example to illustrate.
1.1 Example
In this example, there are two players and two possible payoff-relevant states of the
world, Ω={−1,+1}. Each player i has two possible types, Ti ={−1,+1}, and the state of
the world together with the players’ types are drawn from a common prior1 distribution




4 if ω=ti ·t−i
0 otherwise.
The belief µi(ti) ∈ ∆(Ω×T−i) is then derived by updating µ in a Bayesian fashion, con-
ditional on the realized type ti.
In this type space, each player assigns equal probability to each payoff-relevant
event. These are the ﬁrst-order beliefs. Since player i holds this ﬁrst-order belief re-
gardless of whether i is type is −1 or +1, and since player −i assigns probability 1 to
player i having one of these two types, it follows that each player is certain of the oth-
ers’ ﬁrst-order beliefs. These are the second-order beliefs. The same reasoning implies
that each player is certain of the other’s second-order beliefs and so on. Indeed, in this
simple type space it is always common knowledge that the two states are equally likely.
We can see that Harsanyi’s Bayesian game model is a parsimonious way to formalize
the complex hierarchies of beliefs that previously seemed to be intractable. It has also
1The common prior model was introduced by Harsanyi as a special case of his model. To sharpen our
point this example has a common prior (as this is typical in economic applications) but in our analysis we
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proved straightforward to apply using versions of traditional complete-information so-
lution concepts.
1.2 Foundations of the Harsanyi framework
In the Harsanyi framework, type spaces are a convenient modeling device used to de-
scribe the players’ beliefs and higher-order beliefs. One potential concern with the use
of a type space is the following. If hierarchies of belief are what really matter, then we
must be assured that any hierarchies we might wish to model can be captured in some
type space. This concern has been resolved by Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Bran-
denburger and Dekel (1993) who showed that when the set of states of the world Ω has
some minimal structure, then any internally consistent (“coherent”) hierarchy can be
modeled using a type space. In fact, there exists a single universal type spaceU(Ω) that
simultaneously captures them all: for every coherent hierarchy there is a type in U(Ω)
with that hierarchy.2 Thus, the Harsanyi framework is sufﬁciently general to model any
incomplete information scenario.
Another potential concern has not received the same attention. The type space we
used in our example is but one of many that would capture those speciﬁc hierarchies
of belief. Indeed, any speciﬁcation of the players’ hierarchies can be equally well gener-
ated by many different type spaces. If hierarchies are what matter, and if type spaces are
simplyaconvenientdeviceusedtomodelthem,thenweshouldbeassuredthattheout-
comes we predict for a given hierarchy should not depend on the particular type space
used to model it. However, the type space can matter for outcomes, as can be seen in
the following game.
Consider the following two player game of incomplete information. There are two
states of the world Ω = {−1,+1}. Each player i has three actions Ai = {ai,bi,ci} and a
payoff ui that depends on the actions chosen by each player and the state of the world.
The payoffs are summarized in Figure 1.
a2 b2 c2
a1 1,1 −10,−10 −10,0
b1 −10,−10 1,1 −10,0
c1 0,−10 0,−10 0,0
ω=+1
a2 b2 c2
a1 −10,−10 1,1 −10,0
b1 1,1 −10,−10 −10,0
c1 0,−10 0,−10 0,0
ω=−1
FIGURE 1. A game with incomplete information.
Focusing only on the subsets {ai,bi}, we have a common interest game in which the
players wish to choose the same action in the positive state and the opposite action in
the negative state. Failing to coordinate is costly, and the action ci is a “safe” alternative
when, conditional on the state, i is uncertain of his opponent’s action.
2On the other hand, when the set of states lacks the topological structure assumed by these authors,
Heifetz and Samet (1999) showed that the type space framework may not be sufﬁciently general to model
all coherent hierarchies. See also Meier (2005)22 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Within the Harsanyi framework, once we have described the set of states of the
world, the actions in the game, and the payoffs, we complete the description by spec-
ifying the players’ information, i.e. their hierarchies of belief about payoffs, and then
ﬁnding a suitable type space to model them. Let us suppose that it is common knowl-
edgeamongtheplayersthatthetwostatesoftheworldareequallylikely. Thetypespace
we have already introduced is one way to capture this assumption. We can now apply
standard solution concepts to the resulting Bayesian game. It is a Bayesian Nash equi-
librium for the players to achieve perfect coordination where types ti = +1 play ai and
types ti =−1 play bi. Symmetrically, there is another equilibrium where ti =+1 play bi
and ti = −1 play ai. Obviously it is also an equilibrium for both to play ci independent
of type. It follows that all actions are interim rationalizable for every type.
In the type space under consideration, each player has the same hierarchy of beliefs
regardless of his type. It appears that there is a spurious duplication of types. So instead
consider the simpler type space in which each player has exactly one type and this type
knowstheotherplayer’stypeandassignsequalprobabilitytothetwostatesoftheworld.
Formally, T ∗
i ={∗}andthereisacommonpriorµ∗ givenbyµ∗(∗,∗,+1)=µ∗(∗,∗,−1). This
type space generates exactly the same hierarchies of belief as in our ﬁrst example: com-
mon knowledge that the states are equally likely. However, when the game in our ex-
ample is played over this type space, the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the unique
correlated equilibrium, indeed the unique rationalizable outcome, is for both players to
play ci.3
We cannot be assured that our predictions are invariant to the choice of the type
space. Indeed, specifying the hierarchies was not enough to complete the description
of the environment as it is not only hierarchies that matter for (correlated) equilibrium
and rationalizability. While the additional types in the original type space are duplicates
in terms of their hierarchies, they are not redundant because they generate a payoff-
relevant means of correlating behavior with the state of the world.
This observation has a signiﬁcance for the philosophical debate (see Aumann 1987,
Brandenburger and Dekel 1993, Gul 1998, and Aumann 1998) about whether or not the
information structure in a game is common knowledge. The universal type space has
been interpreted as precisely that information structure that can be assumed without
loss of generality to be common knowledge. For example, Brandenburger and Dekel
(1993) suggest that the universal type space realizes Aumann’s hypothesis of a com-
pletely speciﬁed “state space”. This is certainly true if, as in Brandenburger and Dekel
(1993), one considers the information structure purely as a model of beliefs (about be-
liefs) about uncertain events. But if what is important is the range of possible behaviors
3It deserves emphasis that the issue we are pointing to here is distinct from the familiar one that adding
redundant types to an information structure creates the possibility that the players can correlate their ac-
tion choices and thus increases the set of equilibrium outcomes. That observation is equivalent to the
statement that the set of correlated equilibria of a game is larger than the set of Nash equilibria of a game.
To see that something different is happening in our example, note that the sets of correlated equilibria in
thetwo gamesare distinct. Addingredundanttypes inorder togeneratecorrelation inplaycan neveraffect
the set of correlated equilibria (see Brandenburger and Dekel 1987). Indeed, it can never affect the set of
rationalizable outcomes as it does here.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 23
in a game and not just beliefs, then our example shows that there is a loss of generality
in assuming that the universal type space is commonly known. In particular, this as-
sumption would imply that whenever the players commonly know that each state in the
example is equally likely, they must play action c.4
One of the themes of the debate concerns the appropriateness of different ways of
modeling interactive beliefs. Gul (1998) claims that hierarchies of beliefs are more ap-
propriate if one takes Savage’s (1954) “personalistic" view. Aumann (1998) replies that
the hierarchy and type space models are equivalent and could be used interchangeably
depending on the convenience in a particular application.5 Our observations echo the
claims made in the recent literature (see Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003, Section 6) and
Bergemann and Morris (2005, Section 2.5)) that, in terms of the behavior that can be
modeled, Harsanyi type spaces are more general. Our objective is to understand how
the hierarchies model must be augmented in order to re-establish this equivalence.
1.3 ∆-hierarchies
As argued above, from the point of view of rationalizability, conventional hierarchies of
belief are incomplete as descriptions of a player’s information. The goal of this paper is
to identify a characteristic of a player’s information that is sufﬁcient and necessary for
determiningwhatisrationalizableinanygame. Ideally, wewouldlikethischaracteristic
to be expressible in a language common to the players and the modeler. In particular,
just as with conventional hierarchies of belief it should be described in a way that does
not refertoany particular type space, the symbols of whichare not assumed tohave any
meaning to the players.6
For the solution concept of rationalizability, we are able to identify a characteris-
tic of information, which we call the ∆-hierarchy, that is both necessary and sufﬁcient
for predicting rationalizable behavior in two player games. ∆-hierarchies are inﬁnite
hierarchies of beliefs about conditional beliefs. Perhaps the easiest way to understand
∆-hierarchies is to see how they can be extracted from a type space.
If player i could learn his opponent’s information, i would obtain some conditional




knowledge that the players’ beliefs are coherent.
5Aumann(1998)referstopartitionmodel, whichforourpurposesisequivalenttoHarsanyi’stypespace.
6Itistemptingtosuggestthatthesolutionistodescribetypesbytheirhierarchiesofbeliefoverall events
in Ω×T, not just those that are payoff-relevant. Indeed, the type ∗ and the types {−1,+1} can be distin-
guishedbytheirbeliefsoverstatesand typesoftheopponent. However, thisapproachfailsfortworeasons.
First,thepayoff-irrelevanteventsaretype-spacespeciﬁc,soitwouldbeimpossibletodescribethesebeliefs
in a type-space independent way. Second, distinguishing types by their beliefs over all events only pushes
the problem to the other extreme: types that are truly equivalent would not be treated so. For example,
the two types −1 and +1 have the same rationalizable behavior in every game (this is a consequence of our
main result) and yet they have distinct ﬁrst-order beliefs over the types of the opponent and Ω. Even worse,
any typespacecanbeduplicatedbyre-labelingthetypesorexpandedbyaddingadditionalirrelevanttypes
generatinganewsetofstrategicallyequivalenttypeswhosehierarchiesoverΩ×T areneverthelessdistinct.24 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
belief about the state of the world. So, before knowing the opponent’s information, i
has a prior belief over the many different conditional beliefs he could obtain, were he to
learn it. The ﬁrst-order belief is this probability distribution over possible conditional
beliefs. Within a type space, the ﬁrst-order belief is derived for a type ti as follows.
First, determine for each type t−i of the opponent what would be the conditional be-
lief β(ti,t−i) ∈ ∆Ω of ti if the opponent’s type were known. Then, the probability of any
set Y ⊂∆Ω of possible conditional beliefs is the probability ti assigns to the set of types
t−i forwhichβ(ti,t−i)belongstoY. Oncewehavederivedﬁrst-orderbeliefsofthisform
for every type, we can in the usual way derive the second-order beliefs: the probability
any type ti assigns to the events consisting of ﬁrst-order beliefs of the opponent and the
conditional beliefs of ti. Higher-order beliefs are deﬁned analogously.
Let us see how the types in our type spaces are distinguished by their ∆-hierarchies.
In the ﬁrst type space, conditional on learning the opponent’s type, each type would
learn the state with certainty. Because the two types of the opponent have equal prob-
ability, the ﬁrst-order belief of each type is an equal mixture over Dirac measures. With
probability
1
2 the conditional belief assigns probability 1 to state ω=+1 and with prob-
ability
1
2 the conditional belief assigns probability 1 to state ω = −1. Since all types
have this ﬁrst-order belief, the second-order and higher-order beliefs are again degen-
erate: there is common-knowledge of these ﬁrst-order beliefs. In the second type space,
each type’s ﬁrst-order belief is instead a Dirac measure on an equal mixture. Here, each
type already knows the opponent’s type, so there is nothing new to learn. If i were to
learn the opponent’s type, then with probability 1 the conditional belief would assign
equal probability to the two states. Hence, the ∆-hierarchy of type ∗ is equal to common
knowledge of a Dirac measure on an equal mixture over both states. On the other hand,
not all types have distinct ∆-hierarchies. For example the derivation above shows that
the ∆-hierarchies of types +1 and −1 are the same.
1.4 Overview of results
To recap, a ∆-hierarchy consists of a probability distribution over conditional beliefs
(the ﬁrst-order belief) in ∆Ω, a joint probability distribution over the opponent’s ﬁrst-
order belief and own conditional beliefs (the second-order belief), etc. Just as with con-
ventional hierarchies of belief, while they are implicitly captured within a type space,
their explicit description uses only the natural language of probabilities and conditional
probabilities. In particular the description does not refer to any particular type space.
Furthermore, by an extension of the results of Mertens and Zamir (1985) and Branden-
burgerandDekel(1987)(ourTheorem1),all∆-hierarchiescanbecollectedintoasingle,
“universal" type spaceU (∆Ω) over ∆Ω.
The main result of this paper, Theorem 2, shows that U (∆Ω) is, in a sense, the uni-
versaltypespaceforrationalizability. Precisely, wedividethestatementintothreeparts:
1. Sufﬁciency: Two types with the same ∆-hierarchy have the same rationalizable
behavior in every game.
2. Necessity: For any two types with different ∆-hierarchies there is a game in whichTheoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 25
both types have different rationalizable sets.
3. Non-Redundancy: For each ∆-hierarchy there exists a type space that can be used
to represent it.
To show non-redundancy, we construct a single type space over Ω, called L(Ω) (Sec-
tion 4.1) where the set of types of player i is equal to Li (Ω) = Ui (∆Ω)×∆Ω. Here each
type in Li (Ω) has a label (u ∆
i ,τi), where u ∆ ∈ Ui (∆Ω) is a ∆-hierarchy and τ ∈ ∆Ω is a
useful “dummy" variable. We show that every ∆-hierarchy is represented in Li(Ω). In-
deed, the ∆-hierarchy of type (u ∆
i ,τi) is equal to u ∆
i .
In order to prove sufﬁciency, we study type mappings: mappings that associate the
types in two separate type spaces. We show in Section 4.2 that a type mapping preserves
rationalizable behavior if it preserves conditional beliefs.7 Consider the conditional be-
lief about Ω of type ti in the source type space conditional on a given type t−i of the
opponent. In a type mapping that preserves conditional beliefs, these should be equal
to the belief of the image of ti in the target space, conditional on the image of t−i. We






, where u ∆
i (ti) is the ∆-hierarchy of ti and τ∗ is some ﬁxed dummy.
We show that this mapping preserves conditional beliefs, and therefore preserves ratio-
nalizable behavior. Since two types with the same ∆-hierarchy are mapped to the same
type under this mapping, it follows that their their rationalizable behavior is the same
as that of this (common) image type.
Finally, to show necessity, we pursue a parallel construction (Section 6.1). Any type
in any type space can be interpreted as a rule that associates each game form with the
set of actions that are rationalizable for that type. We construct a space of all rules R
by collecting every rule associated with any type in any type space. We show that R is
naturally seen as a proper type space with ∆Ω as the space of basic uncertainty. A key
step is to characterize the beliefs of type-rules, which is the main subject of Section 6.2.
We show that R and U(∆Ω) are essentially the same type space. The mapping that
associates each type in R with its hierarchy of beliefs is an isomorphism of type spaces,
ι :U(∆Ω) → R and ι−1 : R →U (∆Ω) (Theorem 4). The mapping has the property that
for any type in any type space, the rule of this type can be obtained by ﬁrst computing
its ∆-hierarchy and then applying the mapping ι. Since by deﬁnition two distinct rules
in R are distinguished by some game, it follows that two distinct ∆-hierarchies can be
distinguished by some game.
Along the way, we present some new results on the structure of the rationalizability
correspondence. These are presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 7 comments and
contains further examples.
7Mertens and Zamir (1985) show that belief-preserving mappings preserve conventional hierarchies of
beliefs. Underthesemappingstheconditionalbeliefoftheimagetype,conditionalontypeoftheopponent
t−i, must be equal to the conditional belief of the source type, conditional on all source types of the oppo-
nent that are mapped into t−i. Belief-preserving type mappings do not preserve rationalizable behavior.
See Section 3.1.26 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
1.5 Related literature
An example similar to ours was discovered independently by Dekel et al. (2005a).8 They
introduce a new version of rationalizability in which players can conjecture correlations
between the opponent’s action and the state beyond those correlations that are explic-
itly modeled in the type space. Conventional hierarchies are sufﬁcient to identify the
sets that are rationalizable under this alternative deﬁnition. In the context of our ex-
ample, all actions satisfy their deﬁnition regardless of the type space. Indeed, there is
no type in any type space for which action ci is the only rationalizable action under the
alternative concept. Liu (2005) develops a framework for explicitly describing the corre-
lationsthatdistinguishanytypespacefromitsreduced-formcounterpartinwhicheach
hierarchy of belief is represented by at most one type.
2. BACKGROUND AND PRELIMINARY RESULTS
2.1 Notation
We refer to the identity mapping on a set Y by idY :Y →Y. For any mappings f :A → B,








If A is a measurable space, then ∆A is the set of all probability measures on A (rel-
ative to its given σ-ﬁeld). If A and B are measurable spaces, then the space A × B is
endowed with its product σ-ﬁeld. If A is a topological space, we treat it as a measurable
space with its Borel σ-ﬁeld, denoted BA, and the space of Borel probability measures
on A is denoted ∆A. If A is a Polish space, then ∆A endowed with the weak∗ topology
is also Polish. For any a ∈ A let δ(a) ∈ ∆A be the Dirac measure concentrated on a
point a.





the expectation of f with respect to µ. For measures on product spaces, µ ∈ ∆(A × B),
denote by margA µ∈∆(A) the marginal on A and by CAµ(·): B →∆A a version of condi-
tional probability over A given b ∈ B which exists whenever A is Polish. Our results do
not depend on the choice of version. Similarly, for any measurable subset B0 ⊆ B, we
adopt the notation CAµ(B0) ∈ ∆A to signify the conditional probability measure over A
given B0.
When A is a metric space then we denote by K A the space of all non-empty closed
subsets of A with the Hausdorff metric. If A is Polish, then so is K A.
Giventwomeasurablespaces,A, B andameasurablemappingφ :A → B wecanina
naturalwaydeﬁneamappingthattransportsprobabilitymeasures∆φ :∆A →∆B,such










8See also Bergemann and Morris (2005, Section 2.5) and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003, Section 6) for
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2.2 Games
WeconsidergameswithtwoplayersandtakeasgivenaPolishspaceofbasicuncertainty
Ω. A game form (or simply game) over Ω is a tupleG = (ui,Ai)i=1,2, where for each i, Ai




i ,ui). We construct a product gameG =G1×G2 =(Ai,ui), where the action sets
in G are the products of the actions sets from the original games, Ai = A1
i × A2
i , and






























A game G = (ui,Ai)i is compact if ui are continuous and Ai are compact. A game
G = (ui,Ai)i is ﬁnite if ui are continuous and Ai are ﬁnite. We let G denote the class of
all compact games and G F the smaller class of all ﬁnite games. Unless we speciﬁcally
state a restriction to compact or ﬁnite games, our results apply to all games. Note that if
G1,G2 are compact or ﬁnite, then so isG1 ×G2.
2.3 Type spaces





µi : Ti → ∆(Ω×T−i). We say that a type space has weakly measurable beliefs if for any








are measurable. We say that a type space has strongly measurable beliefs if there exist
jointly measurable functions βi :Ti ×T−i →∆Ω, such that
βi (ti,t−i)=CΩµ(ti)(t−i).
Let Tw(Ω) be the collection of all type spaces over Ω with weakly measurable beliefs and
Ts(Ω) be the collection of all type spaces over Ω with strongly measurable beliefs.9
A type space over Ω is an implicit way of modeling a collection of hierarchies of be-
lief over Ω. As we discussed in the introduction, under most commonly used solution
concepts, what matters for behavior are hierarchies of belief about conditional beliefs.
We can model these in an analogous way using type spaces over the space of basic
uncertainty ∆Ω. The beliefs of a type ti in such a type space T are probabilities over
∆(∆Ω × T−i). We interpret these as joint probabilities over the types of the opponent
and conditional beliefs about Ω. We will consider the class of all type spaces over ∆Ω
with weakly measurable beliefs, denoted Tw (∆Ω).
9Obviously any type space with strongly measurable beliefs has also weakly measurable beliefs, Ts(Ω)⊆
Tw(Ω). The connection in the other way is not clear. For any type space T ∈ Tw(Ω), standard theorems
guarantee existence of conditional beliefs β (ti,t−i) that are measurable in t−i for given ti. We do not know,
in general, whether we can choose conditional beliefs that are jointly measurable. We conjecture that this
is possible for Polish type spaces.28 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
ThereisanaturalwayinwhichanytypespaceT =(Ti,µi)overΩcanbetransformed
into a type space T ∆ = (T ∆
i ,µ∆
i ) ∈ Tw(∆Ω). Let T ∆
i = Ti and for any ti ∈ T ∆
i deﬁne
µ∆
i (ti) ∈ ∆(∆Ω×T−i) to be the unique probability measure satisfying the following two
conditions:








2. conditional beliefs of ti ∈ T ∆
i about ∆Ω given type t−i are a point mass on the







(Recall that δ(·) denotes Dirac delta measure.)
Thelogicbehindthisconstructionisthefollowing. Thetranslatedbeliefsµ∆
i (ti)cap-
ture exactly the joint probability over the opponent’s types and the resulting conditional
beliefs as embodied in µi(ti). In Appendix C.1 we show that this deﬁnes a weakly mea-
surable belief mapping.
LEMMA 1. Suppose that T ∈Ts (Ω). Then T ∆ ∈Tw (∆Ω).
2.4 Type mappings and the universal type space
Take two type spaces T = (Ti,µi), T 0 = (T 0
i ,µ0
i) over the same space of basic uncertainty
X. A type mapping between T and T 0, denoted φ : T → T 0, is a pair of measurable
mappings φi :Ti →T 0
i transporting types from one space to the other.
One can think of a class of type mappings as capturing some notion of equivalency
between types in different type spaces. Two types belong to the same equivalence class
under that notion if they are associated under some type mapping in the class. Roughly
speaking, universal type spaces are those that contain exactly one representative for
each equivalence class. The literature has previously worked with the class of belief-
preserving type mappings.
DEFINITION 1. A type mapping φ between type spaces T, T 0 ∈ Tw(X) preserves beliefs











where ˆ φ =id×φ.
For an example of a belief-preserving type mapping, recall the two type spaces pre-
sented in the introduction. There is exactly one type mapping between the larger and
the smaller type space. This mapping sends both types ti = +1, −1 into one type t
0
i = ∗.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 29
This type mapping also preserves beliefs. Indeed, type ∗ believes that the two states are
equally likely conditional on the opponent having type ∗ and this is the same belief held
by any type ti conditional on the opponent having a type in φ−1(∗)={+1,−1}.
For the class of belief-preserving type mappings, the existence of a universal type
space has been shown by Mertens and Zamir (1985), Mertens et al. (1994), Branden-
burger and Dekel (1993), and Battigalli and Siniscalchi (1999) within various formal set-
tings. We present a version of this result below.
THEOREM 1. Let X be a Polish space and Tw(X) the class of all type spaces over X with
weakly measurable beliefs. There exists a universal type space U(X) ∈ Tw(X) such that
for any type space T ∈ Tw(X), there is a unique beliefs-preserving type mapping u T :
Ti → U (X).10 Moreover, Ui(X) is a Polish space and the belief mapping µ
U(X)
i : Ui(X) →
∆(X ×U−i(X)) is a homeomorphism.
The theorem is a slight generalization of the aforementioned results in that it covers
thecaseofpurelymeasurabletypespacesthatweconsider. (Previousstudiesusedtopo-
logical type spaces with continuous belief mappings.) The proof is an easy adaptation
of the proof due to Mertens et al. (1994) and can be found in Appendix A.
3. INTERIM RATIONALIZABILITY
Throughout the paper, we assume that payoffs in a game G ∈ G depend only on the
actions of both players and the state of the world. Sometimes it is convenient to use
notationthatindirectlymakespayoffafunctionoftypesoftheopponent. Givenapayoff
function ui :A ×Ω→R, we derive a new payoff function πi :A ×T →R, deﬁned directly
in terms of the types as follows:
πi(a,t)=βi(ti,t−i)[ui(ai,a−i,·)].
Thispayoffiscalculatedby“integratingout"theresidualuncertaintyoverΩconditional
on a realized type proﬁle t.
An assessment is a pair of subsets α = (α1,α2) where αi ⊂ Ti ×Ai. Alternatively an
assessment can be deﬁned by the pair of correspondences αi : Ti ⇒ Ai, with αi(ti) :=
{ai : (ti,ai) ∈ αi}. The image αi(ti) is interpreted as the set of actions that player i of
type ti could conceivably play.
Fix a type space T ∈Ts(Ω) and a gameG =(Ai,ui). A behavioral strategy for player i
is a measurable function σi : Ti → ∆Ai. The expected payoff to type ti of player i from
10In the language of category theory, the universal type space is a terminal object within the category of
type spaces Tw (X) connected with belief-preserving type mappings as morphisms.30 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)










The strategy σi is a selection from the assessment α if for each i, σi(ti) ∈ ∆αi(ti) for all
ti ∈Ti. Let Σi(α) be the set of all strategies for i that are selections from α.
A conjecture for player i of type ti is a probability measure σ∆
−i ∈ ∆(T−i ×A−i) such








We say that the conjecture is consistent with the assessment α if σ∆
−i (α−i) = 1. (When
α−i isnotameasurableset, thenwerequirethatσ∆
−i (Y)=1forsomemeasurablesubset
Y ⊂ α−i. When this is the case, for ease of exposition we simply write σ∆
−i (α−i) = 1.) We
denote the set of all conjectures of type ti consistent with α by Σ∆(α|ti).
Behavioral strategies and conjectures are equivalent representations of strategic un-
certainty. For any behavioral strategy σ−i ∈ Σ−i (α) and for any ti, there is a conjecture
σ∆




for every ai ∈ Ai. Conversely, if σ∆
−i is a conjecture for ti, then there is a behavioral
strategy σ−i satisfying the same equalities.12 We work with behavioral strategies or con-






−i | ti) for all a0
i ∈ A−i. Let B(α | ti) denote the set of all interim best-
responses for ti to any conjecture σ∆
−i ∈Σ∆(α|ti).
An assessment α has the best-response property if every action attributed to player i
is an interim best-reply to some conjecture concentrated concentrated on α, i.e.,
αi ⊂{(ti,ai):ai ∈ B (α|ti)}.
If the above is satisﬁed with equality, then we say that α has the ﬁxed-point property.
11This payoff function is deﬁned with respect to a speciﬁc type space. In order to minimize notation,
here and with similar constructs deﬁned later, we omit explicit reference to this dependence whenever the
context is clear.
12The conjecture associated with a given behavioral strategy is unique, but for any conjecture there will
be many equivalent behavioral strategies which differ on sets of measure zero. Also note that if α is an
assessment that is empty for some type t−i, and σ∆
−i ∈Σ∆(α|ti), then an equivalent behavioral strategy σ−i
willsatisfyσ−i(t−i)∈α−i(t−i)forµ(ti)-almosteveryt−i. Butduetotheemptiness,theequivalentbehavioral
strategies are not, strictly speaking, selections from α.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 31
PROPOSITION 1. Thereexistsamaximal(inthesenseofsetinclusion)assessmentwiththe
ﬁxed-point property.
PROOF. It is easy to verify that the union of assessments with the best-response prop-
erty has the best-response property. Let R be the union of all assessments with the best-
response property. Obviously R is the maximal set with the best-response property. We
claim that R has the ﬁxed-point property, in which case it will be the maximal such set.
If R does not have the ﬁxed-point property then there exists a type ti and action ai such
that ai is an interim best-reply to some conjecture consistent with R. But then we can
add the pair (ti,ai) to Ri and obtain a larger assessment with the best-response prop-
erty, a contradiction. 
DEFINITION 2. Given a type space T and a game G, the interim rationalizable corre-
spondence is the maximal assessment with the ﬁxed-point property, denoted RG,T. We
say that ai is interim rationalizable for type ti if ai ∈R
G,T
i (ti).
Note that in general the set R
G,T
i (ti) may be empty. This can happen in games with
discontinuities where best-replies need not exist. In Section 5 we give conditions under
which the rationalizable sets are non-empty. Those results are used only in the parts of
Section 6 where explicitly noted.
3.1 Type mappings that preserve rationalizability
We conclude this section with a result that is central to our analysis. It gives conditions
under which two types, possibly from different type spaces, are equivalent in terms of
rationalizable behavior. In Section 2.4, we discussed how equivalence relations among
typescanbecapturedbyclassesoftypemappings. Equivalenceintermsofbeliefhierar-
chies was captured by the class of belief-preserving type mappings. We now introduce a
new class of type mappings that capture behavioral equivalence under rationalizability.
Let φ be a type mapping between two type spaces T = (Ti,µi), T 0 = (T 0
i ,µ0
i), T, T 0 ∈
Ts (X), deﬁned over the same space of basic uncertainty X. Suppose further that for
every ti there is a measurable mapping φti : T−i → T 0



















The mappings φti are referred to as the dual mappings. We can interpret the dual map-
ping φti as describing how player i type ti “thinks” that types of the opponent are trans-
ported.








In other words, under the dual mapping φti, the beliefs of the opponent are mapped in
a way that is consistent with the underlying type mapping φ.32 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
We will consider type mappings with consistent duals. First note that if φ is a belief-
preserving type mapping, then the mappings φi are themselves consistent duals. In-
deed, (3) is satisﬁed by taking φti = φi for all ti. But belief-preserving type mappings
do not in general preserve rationalizable sets. Indeed, in Section 2.4 we noted that the
type mapping between type spaces from the introduction preserves beliefs. However
this type mapping does not preserve rationalizable sets. Indeed, as we pointed out in
the introduction, rationalizable behavior is different for types ti = +1, −1 and for type
φ(ti)=t 0
i =∗.
Our discussion in the introduction points to the main problem: belief-preserving
type mappings do not in general preserve the structure of conditional beliefs about
payoff-relevant events. This motivates the following deﬁnition.
DEFINITION 3. Let T, T 0 ∈ Ts(X). A type mapping φ : T → T 0 preserves conditional
beliefs iff there exist consistent dual mappings φti such that for any type ti ∈ Ti, for







In other words, the beliefs of type φ(ti) about X conditional on the opponent being
oftypeφti(t−i)arethesameasthebeliefsofti conditionalont−i. Ourresultisthatsuch
type mappings preserve rationalizable sets.
LEMMA 2. Suppose that for type spaces T, T 0 ∈ Ts(Ω) there is a type mapping φ : T → T 0
that preserves conditional beliefs. Then it preserves rationalizable sets, i.e. for every game























To show (5), consider the following assessment for type space T 0:
α0










where ˆ φi = φi ×idA. We will show that α0
i has the best-response property. This directly
implies (5).
Let us writeS0
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Pickti ∈Ti. Lett 0





−i |ti), suchthatai isabest
response for ti against a conjecture σ∆
−i. We construct a conjecture ˆ σ∆




−i ◦ ˆ φ−1
ti . (8)





























The third equality holds because σ∆
−i is a conjecture for ti and the fourth because φti is
a consistent dual.
We claim (8) implies that for any zi ∈Ai,
Ui(zi, ˆ σ∆
−i | ˆ ti)=Ui(zi,σ∆
−i |ti).
To show this, we ﬁrst use the fact that φ preserves conditional beliefs to establish that
the type-dependent payoff function πi is preserved under φ. For any action proﬁle a,























i (a,φ(ˆ ti),φti(ˆ t−i)).
Next, it follows that for any ˆ ti ∈Ti,
Ui(zi,σ∆





i (zi,a−i,φ(ˆ ti),φti(t−i))] (integrating over a−i and t−i)
= ˆ σ∆
−i[πT 0
i (zi,a−i,φ(ˆ ti),t 0
















This establishes our claim.
Next, note that ˆ σ∆
−i is consistent with α0
−i, i.e. ˆ σ∆
−i ∈ Σ∆(α0
−i | t 0









−i )=1. We have therefore shown that
ai ∈ B(α0 |t 0
i). Since ai was arbitrary, we conclude R
G,T
i (ti)⊂ B(α0 |t 0
i).34 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Next consider t 00



















It now follows from (7) that α0 has the best-response property.







Pick ti ∈ Ti. For any t−i, the two types φt−i(ti) and φ(ti) have the same beliefs in T−i




i (φ(ti)). Thus, αi(ti)=
R
G,T 0
i (φ(ti)). We will show that α has the best-response property, which implies (6).
Let ai ∈R
G,T 0
i (φ(ti)) so that there is a conjecture ˆ σ∆
−i ∈Σ∆(R
G,T 0
−i |φ(ti)) such that ai
is a best response of ti against ˆ σ∆


























































Since φti(Ti) has µT 0(φi(ti))-probability 1, this completes the argument that (8) is satis-
ﬁed. Thus, the claim from the ﬁrst half of the proof applies and we can conclude ai is a
best response against σ∆
−i. It remains to show that σ∆
−i ∈Σ∆(α|ti). This follows because
α−i = ˆ φ−1
i (R
G,T 0
−i ), so that
σ∆
−i(α−i)=[σ∆
−i ◦ ˆ φ−1
i ](R
G,T 0




where we have again used (8). Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 35
4. THE MAIN RESULT
In this section we present our main result: ∆-hierarchies are necessary and sufﬁcient
for identifying rationalizable behavior in all games. In the introduction we deﬁned ∆-
hierarchies and demonstrated their construction. Here we present an equivalent deﬁni-
tion that will be more convenient for the formal results.
Recall that any type space T ∈ Ts(Ω) is naturally transformed into a unique type
space T ∆ ∈Tw(∆Ω) (Section 2.3). By Theorem 1, the space T ∆
i is mapped via the belief-
preserving u T ∆
i into the universal space U(∆Ω) of all hierarchies of belief over ∆Ω. The
∆-hierarchy of a type is its image inU(∆Ω) under this mapping.
DEFINITION 4. Let T ∈ Ts(Ω). The ∆-hierarchy of a type ti ∈ Ti is the image u T ∆
i (ti) ∈
U(∆Ω).
THEOREM 2. ∆-hierarchies are necessary and sufﬁcient for identifying rationalizable be-
havior. In particular for any T, ˆ T ∈Ts(Ω), any ti ∈Ti, ˆ ti ∈ ˆ Ti,
1. (Sufﬁciency) if u T ∆
i (ti)=u
ˆ T ∆




i (ˆ ti) for all gamesG
2. (Necessity) if u T ∆
i (ti) 6= u
ˆ T ∆






Moreover,U (∆Ω) does not contain any redundancies:
3. (Non-Redundancy) forany ui ∈Ui (∆Ω),thereisatypeandatypespaceti ∈Ti ∈Ts(Ω)
such that ui =u T ∆
i (ti).
In the remainder of this section we prove the ﬁrst and last claims in the statement.
The proof of necessity requires some additional results on the structure of the rational-
izable correspondence. These are presented in subsequent sections.
4.1 Non-redundancy
We begin with the last claim, that U(∆Ω) contains no redundancies. To that end, we
construct a type space L(Ω) that itself includes all possible ∆-hierarchies, and such that
the mapping u L(Ω)∆
: L(Ω)→U(∆Ω) is onto. Let the space of types be
Li(Ω)=Ui(∆Ω)×∆Ω.
Thelabelofeachtype(ui,τi)∈ Li(Ω)hastwocoordinates. Theﬁrstcorrespondstosome
∆-hierarchy, ui ∈Ui (∆Ω). Thesecond, τi, isaconvenient“dummy”variablewhoserole




as the unique measure satisfying the following two conditions:36 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)






2. conditional on the opponent’s type (u−i,τ−i) ∈ L−i(Ω) =U−i(∆Ω)×∆Ω, the con-




These conditional probabilities are measurable (in fact continuous) so that these
beliefs properly deﬁne a type space with strongly measurable beliefs, L(Ω)∈Ts(Ω). Note
also that the beliefs of type (ui,τi)∈ Li(Ω) depend only on the ﬁrst coordinate ui.
For every ui ∈Ui(∆Ω) there is a type in L(Ω) with that label. It sufﬁces to verify that
the actual ∆-hierarchy of any type in L(Ω) in fact coincides with its label. Indeed, it is
straightforward to check that u
L(Ω)∆
i (ui,τi)=ui for every (ui,τi)∈ Li(Ω).
4.2 Sufﬁciency
To prove sufﬁciency, we begin by constructing for any T ∈ Ts(Ω) a type mapping into
L(Ω). First, ﬁx an arbitrary τ∈∆Ω and let ini :Ui(∆Ω)→ Li(Ω) be the inclusion mapping
inT
i (ui) = (ui,τ) (none of the results below depends on the choice of τ). We may then
deﬁne a type mapping l T
i :T → L(Ω) as the following composition:
l T =inT
i ◦u T ∆
i . (11)
Recall that the mapping u T ∆
i is the unique belief-preserving type mapping from T ∆ to
U(∆Ω). We show in the following lemma that, as a consequence, the mapping l T pre-
serves conditional beliefs.
LEMMA 3. For any type space T ∈Ts (Ω), the type mapping l T :T → L(Ω) preserves condi-
tional beliefs.













This is the product of measurable mappings, hence measurable. (The ﬁrst coordinate
is measurable because of Theorem 1 and the second because T ∈ Ts (Ω).) We verify that
φT
ti satisﬁes equation (2) and is therefore a valid dual mapping. Take any measurable set




























































The third equality follows from the fact that u T ∆ :T ∆ →U (∆Ω) preserves beliefs and the
fourth from the deﬁnition of beliefs on the space T ∆.




























































We can thus apply Lemma 2 and conclude that the type mapping l T preserves ratio-
nalizable sets. In particular, for any gameG,
RG,T(ti)=RG,L(Ω)(l T(ti))
and
RG, ˆ T(ˆ ti)=RG,L(Ω)(l
ˆ T(ˆ ti)).




i (ˆ ti) implies l T(ti) = l
ˆ T(ˆ ti) so that the same set appears on the right-hand sides of
the above equations.
5. STRUCTURE OF THE RATIONALIZABLE CORRESPONDENCE
In this section we analyze the correspondence RG,T mapping types in a ﬁxed type space
T to their rationalizable sets in a ﬁxed game G. When G is a compact and contin-
uous, this correspondence is non-empty, closed-valued, and measurable in a strong38 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
sense.13,14 The measurability of the rationalizable correspondence is used extensively
in the proof of necessity.
PROPOSITION 2. For any gameG ∈G, for each type space T ∈Ts(Ω), for each type ti ∈Ti,
the set R
G,T
i (ti) of interim rationalizable actions is non-empty and closed. Thus, we can
view R
G,T
i as a function from Ti to K Ai. This function is measurable: for every B ∈




is a measurable subset of Ti.
The proof of Proposition 2 proceeds in two steps. First, we show that the rationaliz-
able correspondence is non-empty valued and closed if the type space is a Polish space
and satisﬁes the additional property that the mapping from types to beliefs is continu-
ous in a strong sense.
Precisely, suppose that T is a type space and each Ti is a Polish space. Say that T is
continuous if for each i, the mapping µT
i :Ti →∆(Ω×T−i) is continuous. If, in addition,
there is a version of the conditional belief mapping βi that is continuous then we say
that T is ∆-continuous. Note that ∆-continuity is a stronger property than continuity
alone. When the type space is ∆-continuous and the game is compact, the rationaliz-
able correspondence is upper hemicontinuous with non-empty values. The proof is in
Appendix E.
PROPOSITION 3. Suppose that T is ∆-continuous andG is a compact game. Then R
G,T
i is




step in the proof of Proposition 2 is to show that any type space in Ts(Ω) can be measur-
ably mapped into a ∆-continuous type space in a way that preserves rationalizable sets.
In particular, the space L(Ω) is ∆-continuous.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2. First we assume that T is ∆-continuous. In this case, we
can make use of the following fact. Let Y be a topological space,Z be a Polish space and
ϕ : Y → Z a correspondence with non-empty compact values. If ϕ is upper hemicon-
tinuous, then the function ˆ ϕ : Y → K Z deﬁned by ˆ ϕ(y) = ϕ(y) is Borel-measurable.15
By Proposition 3, R
G,T
i is upper hemicontinuous with non-empty values. The former
implies in particular that it has closed and hence compact values. This establishes the
Proposition in the case of ∆-continuous T.
13It is somewhat surprising that in general the correspondence need not be closed (i.e. upper hemicon-
tinuous)evenforcompactgameswithcontinuoustypespacesandΩcompact,indeedevenforﬁnitegames
when Ω is ﬁnite. This is shown by example in Section 7.
14For compact gamesG, it can also be shown that our ﬁxed-point deﬁnition of rationalizability is equiv-
alent to the outcome of iterative elimination of never-best replies. Since none of our results use the latter
characterization, we have focused on the ﬁxed-point characterization that applies to any game, even those
with discontinuities. For a proof of the iterative characterization, see our working paper, Ely and P˛ eski
(2004, Proposition 6).
15See Aliprantis and Border (1994, Corollary 14.70).Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 39
Notice that L(Ω) is ∆-continuous: the beliefs conditional on a given type of the op-
ponent(τ−i,u−i)areequaltoτ−i regardlessofthetypeofplayeri. Hence,therationaliz-
able correspondence on L(Ω) is upper hemicontinuous (hence closed) and measurable.
Now let T be any type space in Ts(Ω). By Lemmas 2 and 3 there is a measurable






In other words, the correspondence R
G,T
i is the composition of this measurable map-
ping and the closed and measurable correspondence R
G,L(Ω)
i . It follows that R
G,T
i is non-
empty, closed-valued, and when viewed as a function, measurable. 
6. NECESSITY
This section deals with the proof of the necessity part in Theorem 2. To do this, we
introducea newtypespace, R(∆Ω), which canbeviewedas theuniversaltypespace for
rationalizability. Here we brieﬂy outline the construction.
For every type ti in any type space, we can deﬁne a rule of rationalizable behavior
(or simply a rule), ρ(ti), which is a mapping associating any compact gameG ∈ G with
a subset of rationalizable actions of type ti in this game G. By deﬁnition, for any two
types with different rules, there is a game G such that these two types have different
rationalizable sets in G. We may collect all rules of player i that are derived from some
type in some type space into the set Ri.
Now,wecanrestatetheresultthatwearelookingfor: wewanttoshowthattwotypes
with different ∆-hierarchies, u T ∆(ti)6=u T 0∆(t 0
i), necessarily lead to two different rules of
behavior, ρ(ti) 6= ρ(t 0
i). In fact, we show below something stronger. There is a natural
bijective mapping, ι, between rules in R and hierarchies in U (∆Ω), with the property








The proof proceeds as follows. The crucial step is to observe that R can be seen as
a type space over ∆Ω. For this we need to deﬁne beliefs of a rule ri ∈ Ri about ∆Ω and
rules of the opponent R−i. Here is how it can be done. Take any type ti ∈ Ti that leads
to the rule ri and ﬁnd the beliefs of ti about ∆Ω and types of the opponent T−i (these
are the beliefs of ti in type space T ∆ as in Section 2.3). Next, we identify the types of the
opponent with their rules and transform in this way the beliefs of ti into beliefs about
∆Ω and the rules of the opponent.
The ﬁrst main result in this section (Theorem 3) is that any two types whose beliefs
are distinct when viewed in this way must also give rise to distinct rationalizable rules.
The proof involves constructing a ﬁnite game in which the two types have distinct ra-
tionalizable sets. This allows us to complete the description of the type space R(∆Ω) by
deﬁningthebeliefmapping. Thebeliefsofatyperi arederivedasabovefromthebeliefs
of any type ti with such a rule. The theorem implies (see Proposition 4) that the beliefs
will not depend on which such ti we choose (there are of course many).40 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Having constructed the type space R(∆Ω) we present a result that justiﬁes its in-
terpretation as the universal type space for rationalizability. We show how to embed
R (∆Ω) in a type space over Ω, R(Ω). This is analogous to our previous derivation of the
type space L(Ω) ∈ Ts(Ω) from U(∆Ω). So, types in R (Ω) are labeled by two parts: a rule
ri and a “dummy" variable τi ∈∆Ω. We show that this labeling is internally consistent—
types R (Ω) with a label ri (and whatever dummy) actually have ri as their rule,
ri =ρ(ri,τi).
Thus, all possible rationalizable rules are represented by a type.
Finally, we collect together all the mappings deﬁned in this and the previous sec-
tions. Each rule ri can be mapped into a type (ri,τ∗) ∈ R(Ω) (for some ﬁxed dummy
τ∗). Since (ri,τ∗) is a type in a type space over Ω, we can compute its ∆-hierarchy (using
methods from Section 4). This deﬁnes a mapping from R (∆Ω) toU (∆Ω). In fact, this is
the same mapping as the Mertens-Zamir belief preserving mapping guaranteed by The-
orem 1. Going the other way, we can map any ∆-hierarchy ui into type (ui,τ∗) ∈ L(Ω).
Since (ui,τ∗) is a type in a type space over Ω, we may compute its rationalizable rule
ri. This deﬁnes a mapping from U (∆Ω) to R (∆Ω). We show that the former mapping
is an inverse of the latter (Theorem 4). This ﬁnishes the proof of the necessity part of
Theorem 2.
As a by-product (and a method) of the proof, we have showed that the space of all
rules R, which is deﬁned in a highly abstract way, can be naturally reinterpreted as a
type space. This fact is surprising—there is no a priori reason why a universal space for
a solution concept could be characterized in such a way. We do not know whether this
fact is an accident or consequence of some deeper relation.
6.1 The space of rationalizable rules
Here we deﬁne rationalizable rules. The set of all such rules will be used to deﬁne a type






Any element ri of Si can be viewed as a rule that assigns a (closed) subset of AG
i to
eachG ∈G—recall that K AG
i is a compact Polish space with the Hausdorff metric. The
value of a rule ri on a particular gameG ∈ G is denoted by ri (G). We equip Si with the
associated product topology and Borel σ-algebra.
A rule ri is rationalizable if there exists a type space T and a type ti ∈ Ti such that
R
G,T
i (ti) = ri(G) for every G ∈ G. We use the notation ρT
i : Ti → Si for the mapping
16We are implicitly treating the class of compact, continuous games G as a set in the following deﬁnition
and elsewhere. To see that this is valid, recall that by Uryshon’s Metrization Theorem (see Aliprantis and
Border 1994), any Polish action space can be embedded in the Hilbert cube H = [0,1]N. Thus any compact
game can be equivalently viewed as a subset of the set K H×K H×F(H×H×Ω) where F(X) is the set of
real-valued functions on X.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 41
that associates types in T with their corresponding rules. Let Ri be the subset of Si
consisting of all rationalizable rules, i.e.
Ri ={ri ∈Si :ri =ρT
i (ti) for some T ∈Ts(Ω) and some ti ∈Ti}.
The space Ri inherits the topology and σ-algebra from Si. The derived σ-algebra is
denoted BRi. We pause here to record the following important fact used repeatedly
later (the proof can be found in Appendix C.2).
LEMMA 4. For any type space T ∈Ts (Ω), the mapping ρT
i :Ti →Ri is measurable.
Our goal is to treat R as a type space over ∆Ω by assigning beliefs to each rule. To do
this, ﬁrst ﬁnd some type space T and type ti ∈ Ti, such that ρT
i (ti) = ri. Now consider
the corresponding type space T ∆ over ∆Ω. The beliefs µ∆
i (ti) of ti in T ∆ assign proba-
bilities to the types of the opponents and ∆Ω. The mapping ρ−i induces a mapping that











We would like to take these to be the beliefs of the rule ri = ρi(ti). One poten-
tial complication arises from the fact that many different types (in many different type
spaces) can induce the same rule. The beliefs of ri would be well-deﬁned only if all
types that generate the rule ri also generate the same beliefs. The result proved in the
next section implies that this is indeed the case.
6.2 Rationalizable beliefs in a given game
In this section we prove a fundamental intermediate result in the proof of necessity. We
ﬁx a gameG ∈G, a type space T ∈Ts(Ω), and T ∆, its corresponding type space over ∆Ω.
Let us identify the types of player −i with their sets of rationalizable actions inG, i.e. via
the mapping t−i → R
G,T
−i (t−i). Now for any ti the beliefs µ∆
i (ti) naturally induce beliefs












This way of viewing the beliefs of ti strips away all type-space speciﬁc details except
those that are intrinsically relevant for rationalizability in the particular game G. We
call $G,T (ti) the rationalizable beliefs for G. Note the relationship between $G,T (ti)
and the beliefs over rules presented in the previous subsection. Since R
G,T
−i (t−i) =
ρ−i(t−i)[G], they are the marginals of the latter corresponding to just the speciﬁc game
G.
Consider two types ti, t 0
i whose beliefs agree when viewed in this way, i.e. $G,T(ti)=
$G,T 0(t 0
i). It is not hard to see that these types must have the same rationalizable sets in
G.17 We are interested in a converse. However, if $G,T(ti)6=$G,T 0(t 0
i), it does not follow
17Therationalizableactionsofatypearejustthesetofbest-repliestoallconjecturesaboutrationalizable
actions of the opponent and states of the world. The condition implies that the two types have the same
set of possible conjectures, hence the same set of best-replies.42 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
that ti and t 0
i necessarily have distinct rationalizable sets in G.18 Nevertheless we can
show that if two types have differing beliefs relative toG, then there is another gameG0
in which their rationalizable sets differ. MoreoverG0 is a ﬁnite game even ifG is not.
THEOREM 3. Let G be any compact game. Let T, T 0 ∈ Ts (Ω) and consider any two types,
ti ∈Ti and t 0
i ∈T 0
i . If ti and t 0
i differ in terms of their rationalizable belief in gameG, i.e.





then there is a ﬁnite gameG0 in which ti and t 0











For the proof of Theorem 3, we need a technical lemma whose proof is in Appendix
B. The lemma establishes that any two distinct beliefs can be “separated” by a certain
class of function. The function will be used to construct payoffs in the game mentioned
in the statement of Theorem 3.
LEMMA 5. For any gameG =(Ai,ui) and µ, µ0 ∈∆(∆Ω×K A−i), if µ6=µ0 then there are
natural numbers N1, N2 and a continuous bounded function ψ : {1,...,N1}×A
N2
−i ×Ω →














































We will prove the theorem by constructing a game G = (Aj,uj) such that RG,T(ti) 6=
RG,T(t 0
i).
First, ﬁnd a game G0 = (A0
j,u 0
j ) such that A0
−i = {1,...,N1} and all actions of player
−i are rationalizable for all types of player −i, i.e. for any t−i ∈ T−i and any t 0
−i ∈ T 0
−i,
18A simple counterexample, but by no means the only one, is a game in which player i is indifferent
among all of his actions in any state ω ∈ Ω, but player −i is not. Different types of −i may have distinct
rationalizable sets so that different types of player i will have distinct beliefs about the rationalizable sets
of −i. Despite this, the rationalizable actions will be the same for all types of i.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 43
R
G0,T








−i. (Such a game always exists.) Denote Z = {0,1} and



























































































We show that the rationalizable sets for types ti and t 0
i are different in G. First ob-
























In the type space T, consider the (pure) behavioral strategy of player −i that for type
s−i selects a0








−i,N2,ω)]. By the measurable maximum theorem,
this deﬁnes a measurable selection from R
G,T
−i .19 Call this strategy σ−i. We can deﬁne
the analogous strategy σ0
−i for type space T 0 where type t 0
i replaces ti in the deﬁnition.
We calculate the payoff to type t 0















































is measurable in s−i and R
G∗,S






. On the other hand, the strategy σ−i clearly maximizes, among all ra-
tionalizable strategies for player −i in type space T, the payoff that type ti could receive






















Hence 1 / ∈Z(ti). 
6.3 The universal type space for rationalizability
Theorem 3 allows us to complete the description of R(∆Ω) by deﬁning beliefs. Let ri be












The question raised in Section 6.1 is whether these beliefs are well-deﬁned, in par-
ticular whether they depend on the choice of ti. We can interpret Theorem 3 as stat-
ing that all single-game marginals of these beliefs are independent of the choice of ti.
The following proposition extends the conclusion to the entire measure by an appeal to
product games and an application of Kolmogorov’s extension theorem.
PROPOSITION 4. For any two type spaces T, T 0 ∈Ts(Ω) if two types ti ∈Ti, t 0
i ∈T 0
i have the






i) for all G ∈G F






















PROOF. By the Kolmogorov extension theorem, it is enough to show that for any ﬁnite




























































To show this we consider product games (deﬁned in Section 2). Observe that the set of
rationalizableactionsintheproductgameG =G1×···×Gk isjusttheproductofthesets
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By Theorem 3, if ti and t 0
i have the same rationalizable sets in all ﬁnite games, then the
same belief appears on the right hand sides. This concludes the proof. 
Having deﬁned the beliefs, we must now show that the belief mapping is weakly
measurable, so that R(∆Ω) is a well-deﬁned type space. The proof can be found in
Appendix C.2.
PROPOSITION 5. Thebeliefmapping µR
i :Ri →∆(∆Ω×R−i)isweaklymeasurable. Thus
R(∆Ω)∈Tw (∆Ω).
Next, we will embed R(∆Ω) within a type space over the basic space of uncertainty
Ω to verify that our construction is internally consistent, i.e. the rationalizable behavior
ofatyperi isindeedri. Theconstructionisdirectlyanalogoustoourpreviousconstruc-
tion of L(Ω) fromU(∆Ω).
Precisely, we deﬁne a type space R(Ω) over Ω in the following way. Let Ri ×∆Ω be




as the unique measure satisfying the following two conditions:











These conditional probabilities are measurable (in fact continuous) so that these
beliefs properly deﬁne a type space with strongly measurable beliefs, R(Ω)∈Ts(Ω).20
Finally, to justify referring to R(∆Ω) as the universal space for rationalizability (in
addition to more instrumental purposes later on), we now show that the construction
is internally consistent. In particular, each type in R(Ω) is “labeled” by a rationalizable
rule. We will demonstrate that the actual rule of a type coincides with its label.
Fix an arbitrary τ ∈ ∆Ω. For any type space T ∈ Ts(Ω), consider the type-mapping




The measurability of φT follows from Lemma 4.
20The construction of the type space R(Ω) over Ω is somewhat arbitrary. In fact, there are many ways to
construct a valid model (among type spaces over Ω) for R(∆). (By contrast, the type space R(∆) is unique
uptoisomorphisms, asweprovelater.) Wehavechosentheconstructioninthetextasitisthemostnatural
and convenient for expositional purposes.46 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
PROPOSITION 6. ForanytypespaceT ∈Ts (Ω),thetypemapping φT :T →R(Ω)preserves
conditional beliefs. Hence, it preserves rationalizable sets. Moreover, for any rule ri ∈ Ri











The measurability follows from Lemma 4. Following exactly the line of argument used
in the proof of Lemma 3, we may check that these are consistent duals and that φ is a
conditional-belief preserving type mapping.
Take now any rationalizable rule ri ∈ Ri and an arbitrary ˆ τ ∈ ∆Ω. There is a type
in a type space ti ∈ Ti such that ri = ρT
i (ti). Since the type mapping φT preserves






i (ri, ˆ τ).
The last equality comes from the fact that beliefs of types in R(Ω), hence also their ra-
tionalizable sets, depend only on the ri-coordinate. 
COROLLARY 1. The following statements are equivalent.
(i) ri =r0
i.
(ii) ri and r0







PROOF. The implication (i) =⇒ (ii) is trivial. The implication (ii) =⇒ (iii) is a restate-
ment of Proposition 4. To show (iii) =⇒ (i), consider the types types (ri,τ) and (r0
i,τ) in
R(Ω) for arbitrary τ ∈ ∆Ω. By (iii) and the construction of R(Ω), they have the same
beliefs. Thus, they have the same rationalizable sets in every game, i.e. the same rule. By
Proposition 6 the rule of (ri,τ) is ri and the rule of (r0
i,τ) is r0
i. Thus ri =r0
i. 
6.4 R(∆Ω) is isomorphic toU(∆Ω)
Finally, we show the central result of the paper: the two spaces U(∆Ω) and R(∆Ω), al-
thoughdescribedindifferentways,areequivalentintermsoftheirrelevantstructure. In
particularweshowinthissubsectionthattheyareisomorphicunderabelief-preserving
type mapping. The following lemma plays an important role.
Deﬁne the projection projT : T × ∆Ω → T by projT (ti,τi) = ti, and for arbitrary
τ∈∆Ω the inclusion inT,τ :T →T ×∆Ω by inT,τ(ti)=(ti,τ), so that
projT ◦inT,τ =idT .
The next lemma states a handy property that connects the category of type spaces
over Ω with type spaces over ∆Ω. (It is proved in Appendix D.)Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 47
LEMMA 6. Let S, T ∈Tw (∆Ω).
(i) For any belief preserving type mapping φ∆ :S →T, the composite mapping
φ =inT,τ◦φ∆ ◦proj
S
is a conditional beliefs preserving type mapping φ :S ×∆Ω→T ×∆Ω.
(ii) Suppose different types in T have different beliefs, ti 6= t 0











is a belief preserving type mapping φ∆ :S →T.21
The property assumed in the second part of the lemma is satisﬁed by both spaces
U (∆Ω)andR(∆Ω). Intheformercase,thisisthelastpartofthestatementofTheorem1.
In the latter case, this is Corollary 1.
THEOREM 4. There are unique beliefs-preserving type mappings ι :U (∆Ω)→R(∆Ω) and
ι−1 : R(∆Ω) → U (∆Ω). Either mapping is the inverse of the other: ι−1 ◦ι = idU(∆Ω) and
ι◦ι−1 =idR(∆Ω).
PROOF. Existence and uniqueness of the type mapping ι−1 is assured by Theorem 1.
In order to show existence of a beliefs-preserving type mapping fromU (∆Ω) to R(∆Ω),
note ﬁrst that by the ﬁrst half of Proposition 6, there is a conditional beliefs-preserving
type mapping φL(Ω),τ : L(Ω) → R(Ω). The second part of Lemma 6 then guarantees
existence of a beliefs-preserving mapping
 
φL(Ω),τ∆ :U (∆Ω)→R(∆Ω).
Supposenowthatwehavetwodifferentbelief-preservingmappingsι1, ι2 :U (∆Ω)→
R(∆Ω). There is ui ∈ Ui(∆Ω) such that ι1(ui) 6= ι2(ui). By the ﬁrst part of Lemma 6
there are then two type mappings φ1,φ2 : L(Ω)→R(Ω) that preserve conditional beliefs
and satisfy φ1(ui,τ) = (i1(ui),τ) 6= (i2(ui),τ) = φ2(ui,τ). By Lemma 2, φ1(ui,τ) and
φ2(ui,τ) must have the same rationalizable rules. But this is a contradiction because
Proposition 6 shows that the rationalizable rule for φ1(ui,τ) is ι1(ui) while the rational-
izable rule for φ2(ui,τ) is ι2(ui).
The equality ι−1 ◦i = idU(∆Ω) comes from the uniqueness of belief-preserving type
mapping fromU (∆Ω) to itself. The second equality i ◦ι−1 =idR(∆Ω) is a consequence of
thefactthati◦ι−1 wouldgenerateaconditionalbeliefpreservingmappingfromR(Ω)to
itself (the ﬁrst part of Lemma 6 guarantees that). Such a mapping has to preserve rules,
so it has to preserve r-coordinates of types in R(Ω) This implies that i ◦ι−1 =idR(∆Ω). 
21Within the framework of category theory, the lemma deﬁnes functors between the category of type
spaces over Ω (with morphisms corresponding to conditional-belief-preserving type mappings) and the
category of type spaces over ∆Ω (with morphisms corresponding to belief-preserving type mappings).48 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
6.5 Proof of necessity
The structure of the proof can be seen via the following diagram which collects various









:: u u u u u u u u u















Suppose u T ∆
i (ti)6=u T ∆
i (t−i). By Corollary 1, in order to show that the two types have
distinctrationalizablesetsinsomeﬁnitegame, itsufﬁcestoshowthattheyhavedistinct
rationalizable rules. Consider the route in the diagram T →T ∆ →U(∆Ω)→ L(Ω), which
by Lemma 3 preserves rationalizable sets. The images of ti and t 0
i under this mapping
are elements of L(Ω) with distinct ﬁrst coordinates (namely u T ∆
i (ti) and u T ∆
i (t 0
i)). We
show that they have distinct rationalizable sets which implies the same for ti and t 0
i,
concluding the proof.
Because ι is one-to-one (by Theorem 4), if two types in L(Ω) have distinct ﬁrst coor-
dinates, then their images under ˜ ι also have distinct ﬁrst coordinates. And by Proposi-
tion 6, if two types in R(Ω) have distinct ﬁrst coordinates, then they have distinct ratio-
nalizable rules. In particular there is some game in which they have distinct rationaliz-
able sets. Now by Theorem 4 and Lemma 6 the mapping ˜ ι preserves conditional beliefs.
By Lemma 2 it preserves rationalizable sets. We conclude that two types in L(Ω) with
distinct ﬁrst coordinates have distinct rationalizable rules. 
7. COMMENTS AND OTHER EXAMPLES
7.1 Example
The conventional universal type spaceU(Ω) is not rich enough from the point of view of
solution concepts such as Bayesian equilibrium or Rationalizability. We have previously
shown this by demonstrating that there are types whose rationalizable rules are not rep-
resented by any type in U(Ω). Here we present an example that makes the point even
stronger: there is an action that is not rationalizable for any type inU(Ω), yet as we show
below, it is easy to construct simple, perfectly standard type spaces in which the action
is rationalizable. Consider the two-player game with two states of the world with payoff




a1 1,1 1,−9 −1,−9 −1,−1
b1 −9,1 0,0 −9,−9 −9,−1
b0
1 −9,−1 −9,−9 0,0 −9,1
a0





a1 1,1 1,−9 −1,−9 −1,−1
b1 −9,1 −9,−9 0,0 −9,−1
b0
1 −9,−1 0,0 −9,−9 −9,1
a0
1 −1,−1 −1,−9 1,−9 1,1
ω=−1
FIGURE 2. Actions bi and b0
i are not rationalizable inU(Ω).
We will show that neither bi nor b0
i are rationalizable for any type inU(Ω). Note ﬁrst
that an equal mixture between ai and a0




the action is correlated with the state. Now if i assigns greater than
1
2 probability to state
+1, then it is easily veriﬁed that action ai achieves strictly higher payoff than bi, and
action a0
i achieves strictly higher payoff than b0
i, regardless of the opponent’s strategy.
Likewise, if the probability of state +1 is less than
1
2, then ai must do better than b0
i and
a0
i better than bi. Thus, actions bi or b0
i can be rationalizable only for types who assign
the two states equal probability and who assign probability 1 to opponent’s types for
whom b−i or b0
−i are rationalizable. Now the game is symmetric, so the same analysis
applies to player −i with the players’ roles reversed. Putting these two conclusions to-
gether, actions bi and b0
i are rationalizable only for types of player i who assign equal
probability to the two states and probability 1 to the event that player −i has the same
beliefs and assigns probability 1 to the event that bi and b0
i are rationalizable for i. By
induction, bi and b−i are rationalizable only for those types of player i for whom it is
common-knowledge that the two states are equally likely. Let υi be the type in Ui(Ω)
with this hierarchy of beliefs, and υ−i the analogous type for player −i. Note that in
U(Ω), type υi assigns probability 1 to υ−i and equal probability to the two states. But
then no matter what mixed action is played by υ−i, it is never correlated with the state.
Thus bi and b0
i can never be best-replies, hence never be rationalizable for type υi.
Nevertheless, both bi and b0
i are rationalizable for all types in the type space from
the introduction. Indeed, any pure strategy proﬁle in which the two types of each player
play different actions in {bi,b0
i} is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
7.2 More than two players
In games with more than two players, there are many natural ways to extend the deﬁ-
nition of rationalizability. This is well-understood already in the context of complete-50 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
information where correlated rationalizability allows players to conjecture that the op-
ponents’ play is correlated while independent rationalizability does not. When infor-
mation is incomplete, there is an even greater variety of plausible extensions due to the
greater variety of ways in which conjectures can be correlated. First, a player may sup-
pose that the opponents achieve correlation by conditioning their play on the outcome
of some randomization device that is uncorrelated with the state of the world. A differ-
ent set of conjectures would result if a player were to entertain the possibility that the
opponents communicated their private information to one another prior to choosing
their actions. Combining these two possibilities would lead to a larger set of conjec-
tures. Of course the assumption that the opponents cannot correlate at all would lead
to the smallest set of conjectures. Each of these four possibilities would be extensions of
interim rationalizability in the sense that they would reduce in two player games to the
deﬁnition we have employed. Our method of analysis can be adapted to these versions
ofrationalizability. Our conjectureis thatthe necessaryand sufﬁcientconditions willbe
different for each of these different versions. The task of characterizing these conditions
is left for future work.
Finally, one version of rationalizability that is not an extension of interim ratio-
nalizability is the concept of correlated interim rationalizability studied by Dekel et al.
(2005a). In that concept a player may conjecture that the opponents condition on a
randomization device that is correlated in arbitrary ways with the unknown state of the
world. This removes the distinction between the two type spaces we presented in the
introduction. Dekel et al. (2005a) show more generally that correlated interim rational-
izability depends only on conventional hierarchies of belief.
7.3 Upper hemicontinuity
Theliteraturehashadsomeinterestinﬁndingthe“right”topologyontheuniversaltype
space to capture similarity of types with respect to their strategic behavior.22 One re-
quirement of such a topology is that the rationalizable correspondence should be up-
per hemicontinuous. Our results shed some light on this requirement. We have shown
(Proposition 3) that a sufﬁcient condition for upper hemicontinuity is that the topology
be ﬁne enough so that conditional beliefs are continuous. Here we present an exam-
ple where this strong form of continuity fails and the correspondence fails to be upper
hemicontinuous.
Suppose that Ω = {−1,1} and consider the game from the introduction and the fol-




2 if t−i ∈{ti,−ti} and sign[ti ·ω]=sign[t−i]
0 otherwise.
It is easy to verify that these beliefs are generated by a common prior and are con-
tinuous as a function of ti. However conditional beliefs over Ω exhibit a discontinuity at
22See Monderer and Samet (1997), Kajii and Morris (1998), Morris (2002), Weinstein and Yildiz (2003),
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ti =t−i =0. Indeed,ifti =t−i 6=0,thenti assignsprobability1tostateω=1conditional
on t−i, but if ti =t−i =0, then both states have equal conditional probability.
For ti = t−i 6= 0, the set {−ti,+ti}×{−t−i,+t−i} is a belief-closed subspace that is
isomorphic to the ﬁrst type space from the introduction. Thus, all actions are rational-
izable for these types. However, the belief-closed subspace {0} × {0} is isomorphic to
the second type space and hence action ci is the unique rationalizable action for types
ti = t−i = 0. Thus, for this ﬁnite game with a ﬁnite set of states of the world and contin-
uous belief-mapping, the rationalizable correspondence is not upper hemicontinuous.
7.4 Universal type space for the measurable case
Following the literature, we say that a type space U over a space of basic uncertainty
X is universal among type spaces with property Y if for every such type space there
is a unique mapping into U that preserves beliefs. Mertens et al. (1994) showed that
there exists a universal type space for all continuous type spaces, assuming X is a Polish
space. On the other hand, Heifetz and Samet (1999) showed that there is no universal
type space for measurable (not necessarily continuous) type spaces when X is assumed
onlytobemeasurable. OurTheorem1,whoseproofisonlyaslightadaptationoftheone
in Mertens et al. (1994), is a positive result for an in-between case. It shows the existence
of a universal measurable type space under the assumption that X is Polish. This may
be comforting because while it is questionable to assume some particular structure on
a type space (as it is nothing more than an artiﬁcial modeling construct), there may be
good reason to assume structure on the physical world X.
7.5 Type-space independent description ofU(∆Ω).
We sought in this paper a characterization of interactive beliefs that is necessary and
sufﬁcient to identify rationalizable behavior. We wanted this characterization to be de-
scribable in natural language terms that are independent of any modeling device such
as a type space. Here we observe that just as with conventional hierarchies of belief, a
player’s ∆-hierarchy can be elicited by a sequence of questions concerning beliefs and
higher-orderbeliefs. Onewaytoposetheseistobeginwiththefollowingbasicquestion:
“Given any set of actions for your opponent, what is the set of distributions over actions
and states of the world that you could face?” The answer to this question reveals the
player’s ﬁrst-order ∆-belief. After receiving an answer to this question, the remainder
of the hierarchy is elicited analogously as with conventional hierarchies: “Given any set
of actions for your opponent, what would you consider possible within the set of joint
probability distributions over the state, your opponent’s action, and your opponent’s
answer to the previous question?”
7.6 Other solution concepts
The universal type space U(Ω) is the smallest (i.e. most parsimonious) type space that
is complete in terms of conventional hierarchies of belief. We showed however that in
order to analyze games using the concept of rationalizability, we need the larger space52 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
U(∆Ω). CanweconcludethatU(∆Ω)istherightuniversaltypespace? Certainlynot: de-
pending on the application the modeler will need a different property of players’ infor-
mation, and this will correspond to potentially different type spaces that are “universal”
with respect to this property. For example, we may carry out a similar investigation for
othersolutionconceptssuchasBayesianNashequilibrium(BNE).Itiseasytoconstruct
examples to show that even U(∆Ω) is not rich enough for BNE: two types can have the
same ∆-hierarchy and yet play differently in BNE.23 This raises a few questions. First,
is there a primitive characteristic of information that is sufﬁcient to characterize BNE
behavior? Second, is there a single universal type space that is sufﬁcient to characterize
behavior in all “standard” solution concepts?
The ﬁrst question is a topic for further research. For the second question we have a
partial answer. Suppose there exists a type space P(Ω) with the property that any type
space can be mapped by an injective, belief-preserving type mapping into P(Ω). Then
P(Ω) would be the type space we seek (although it may not be the most parsimonious).
Effectively, P(Ω) would include a complete replica of every type space.
In general such a type space will not exist. However, if we restrict attention to the
category of Polish type spaces, then existence can be established.
CLAIM. There is a Polish type space over Ω, P(Ω) ∈ Tw (Ω), such that for any Polish type
space T ∈Tw (Ω), there is an injective, belief-preserving type mapping πT :T →P(Ω).
Details are available from the authors.
APPENDIX
A. SKETCH OF PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The proof is a minor adaptation of Mertens et al. (1994). We mention here only the
changes necessary to accommodate type spaces with weakly measurable (i.e. not nec-
essarily continuous) belief mappings. The remainder is identical.
We ﬁrst recall the deﬁnition of a projective limit. Suppose that we have a sequence
of Polish spaces {Pn}n≥0 together with a sequence of continuous mappings hn : Pn+1 →









= pn for all n. Such a set is a Polish space in the product topology. The
induced projection mappings Hn :P →Pn are continuous.
Mertens et al. (1994) construct the universal type space U (X) for Polish X as the











23The simplest example is a game of complete information, i.e. when Ω is a singleton. Then any type in
any type space over Ω has the same (degenerate) ∆-hierarchy. But the set of BNE outcomes expands as the




i are deﬁned inductively by
h0















. The induced projection
mappings Hn
i :Ui(X)→Un





Mertens et al. (1994) show that one can construct a continuous belief mapping µ∗
i :









This property implies that the mapping µ∗
i is a homeomorphism between Ui (X) and
∆(X ×U−i (X)). (Observe that for any ui ∈ Ui (X), there is exactly one belief µ∗
i such
that (12) is satisﬁed: by the deﬁnition of the projective limit, two different measures on





for at least one n.




































Mertens et al. (1994) show that if the type space T is continuous (the belief mapping
is continuous) then there exists a sequence of continuous u
T,n







i , that extend to the continuous mapping u T
i :Ti →Ui, which is the unique mapping
that preserves beliefs. The difference in our case is that we are not able to guarantee the
continuity of the mappings u
T,n
i . However, we show that weak measurability of the be-
lief mapping assures that the maps u
T,n
i deﬁned exactly in the same way as in Mertens




i : Ti →Ui, for some u ∗
i ∈Ui, which converge to the measurable map-
ping u T
i :Ti →Ui. For the same reasons, this mapping preserves beliefs.
Precisely, we use the following lemma.
LEMMA 7. Let T ∈Tw(X)andsupposethatthereisaPolishspace B andmeasurablemap-
































and the last set is measurable by the deﬁnition of weak measurability of µi(ti). 54 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
Choose now an arbitrary u ∗
i ∈ Ui and construct mappings u
T,n













By the lemma, each of these mappings is measurable. Moreover, they converge point-
wise to the mapping u T
i , which is also measurable (as a pointwise limit of measurable
mappings). Exactly as in Mertens et al. (1994), we can verify that it is the unique belief-
preserving mapping.
B. PROOF OF LEMMA 5




∈ G, deﬁne the following
















for some natural N1,N2 and






On the ﬁrst coordinate τ∈∆Ω, the functions f ∈F G are “piecewise linear” and convex.
On the second coordinate K ∈ K A−i, they are set-increasing: for any two sets K ⊆ K 0,




f − g : f ,g ∈F G©
⊆C (∆Ω×K A−i).
ThefollowingstrongerversionofLemma5willbeusedalsointheproofofProposition5.








⊆ ∆(∆Ω×K A−i) for
f ∈ L G generates the weak∗ topology on ∆(∆Ω×K A−i). In particular, for any µ,µ0 ∈









The following notation and preliminary results will be used in the proof. Let H de-
notetheHilbertcube[0,1]N. SinceΩisPolish,thereisacountablesequenceoffunctions
h∗






































The mapping H embeds ∆Ω (with the weak* topology) in the Hilbert cube (with the
producttopology). SupposewehaveafamilyF ofcontinuousfunctions f :H×K A−i →
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isasubbasefortheweak*topologyon∆(H×K A−i)(inwhichcasewesaythatF gener-
ates the topology). Then, because H is an embedding, it will follow that the correspond-
ing family F 0 ⊂C(∆Ω×K A−i) with
F 0 ={f 0 : f 0(τ,K)= f (H(τ),K) for some f ∈F}
generates the topology on ∆(∆Ω×K A−i). The strategy of proof is to ﬁnd such an F so
that the corresponding F 0 is included in L G.
For each natural number n, deﬁne the following set of continuous functions f :
[0,1]













for some natural numbers N1,N2 and

















We have a lemma.







theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 7.45)). We need to verify that Ln:
• is closed under scalar multiplication: If (f −g)∈Ln, then for any λ∈R, λ(f −g)∈
Ln as well;
• contains a constant function: 1∈Ln;
• is closed under ﬁnite sums: ﬁrst note that for any f , g ∈ Fn, z = (z1,...,zm) ∈
[0,1]
n and K ∈K A−i






























































so that f +g ∈Fn. But this implies that for any (f −g), (f 0−g 0)∈Ln we also have  
f + f 0
−
 
g + g 0
∈Ln;56 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
• is closed with respect to taking the maximum of two functions: for any f , g ∈Fn,
z ∈[0,1]




















































































































∈Fn. Together with the fact that
max

f − g, f 0 − g 0	
=max





g + g 0
and the previous point, it implies that max

f − g, f 0 − g 0	
∈ Ln for any f − g,
f 0 − g 0 ∈Ln;
• separates points: for any z,z0 ∈ [0,1]
n, z 6= z0, there is vector η ∈ Rn, such that
η·z 6=η·z0. Similarly,forany K,K 0 ∈K A−i, K 6= K 0,thereisacontinuousfunction









Finally we can prove Lemma 50. Any f ∈C([0,1]n ×K A−i) can be viewed as an ele-
ment f 0 ∈C(H×K A−i) by writing f 0(h,K) = f (h1,...,hn,K). By the Stone-Weierstrass
theorem (algebraic version, see Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 7.46)) the subset
∪nC([0,1]n ×K A−i) is uniformly dense in C(H×K A−i). By Lemma 8, the family Ln is
uniformly dense in C ([0,1]n ×K A−i). Thus ∪nLn is uniformly dense in ∪nC([0,1]n ×
K A−i) and hence in C(H×K A−i). We conclude that the family ∪nLn generates the
topology on ∆(H×K A−i) (see Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem 12.2)).
The proof is now completed by showing that each f ∈Ln corresponds to a function
f 0 belonging to L G by the formula f 0(τ,K) = f (H(τ),K). By the linear structure of L G
it sufﬁces to show that for each g ∈Fn, the composition g ◦H :∆Ω×K AG
−i →R belongs












































N2 ×Ω into R, we conclude that g ◦H is an element of F G. Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 57
C. RESULTS ON MEASURABILITY
C.1 Proof of Lemma 1
We need the following result.
LEMMA 9. Let A and B be measurable spaces and g : A × B → [0,1] a jointly measurable
map. If m : A → ∆(B) is measurable, then the map Lg : A → R deﬁned by Lg(a) =
m(a)[g(a,·)] is measurable.
PROOF. Thereexistsasequenceofsimplefunctions gn :A×B →Rsuchthat gn ↑ g and
by the deﬁnition of the Lebesgue integral, for any probability measure ν ∈∆(A × B),
ν[gn]→ν[g].
In particular, for any given a ∈ A, if ν is the measure whose marginal on B is m(a) and
whose marginal on A is δa,
Lgn(a)=ν[gn]→ν[g]= Lg(a).
Thus, if we can show that Lf is measurable for all simple functions f , then we will have
shown that Lg is measurable as the pointwise limit of measurable mappings.
First consider f = 1α×β for α ⊂ A and β ⊂ B (measurable). We have Lf (a) = 1α(a)·
m(a)(β) which is measurable since m was assumed to be measurable. Thus, Lf is mea-
surable for all f that are indicators of product sets. Now for any ﬁnite k, let α1,...,αk
and β1,...,βk be measurable subsets of A and B respectively and note that for f = Qk





is measurable. Thus if f =1∩l (αl ×βl ) =
Q
l 1αl ×βl , then Lf is measurable, and if










then Lf is measurable as a linear combination of measurable functions. Note also that
L1¬E = L1−1E = 1−L1E. Thus Lf is measurable for all indicator functions f of sets in the
algebra generated by the product sets.
Now consider any sequence Xn with Xn ⊂ A × B, Xn ⊂ Xn+1 for all n and ∪nXn = X.
The corresponding sequence L1Xn is an increasing sequence of maps converging point-
wise to L1X. Thus if L1Xn are measurable for all n, so is L1X. It follows that the collection
of sets X such that L1X is measurable is a monotone class. Since it includes the algebra
generatedbytheproductsets,bythemonotoneclasslemmaitincludesthecorrespond-
ingσ-algebra,i.e.theproductsigma-algebraonA×B. Finally,sinceanysimplefunction
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for some coefﬁcients cj and measurable sets Xj ⊂A ×B, any such Lf is measurable as a
linear combination of measurable functions. 




ismeasurable. Deﬁne g(ti,t−i)= f (βi(ti,t−i),t−i). Notethat g isjointlymeasurableand
µ∆
i (ti)[f ]=µi(ti)[g(ti,·)].
Now apply Lemma 9. 
C.2 Proof of Lemma 4 and Proposition 5
PROOF OF LEMMA 4. BythemonotoneclasstheoremandthechoiceoftopologyonRi,
we need to check that for any ﬁnite number of gamesG1,...,Gk ∈G and open set KA ⊆
K AG1
i ×···×K AGn







































(KA) is measurable in Ti. 
For the proof of Proposition 5 we need a lemma identifying some measurable sub-
sets of rationalizable rules.
LEMMA 10. For any game G = (Ai,ui) ∈ G, for any closed subset A0 ⊆ Ai, the subset of
rationalizable rules {ri ∈Ri :ri (G)⊆A0} is closed in Ri.
PROOF. For closed A0, the set K A0 ={K ∈K Ai : K ⊂A0} is closed in K Ai (see Alipran-
tis and Border (1994, Theorem 3.63)). Thus, by the deﬁnition of the product topology on
Ri,

ri ∈Ri :ri (G)⊆A0	
={ri ∈Ri :ri(G)∈K A0}
is closed. 




is Borel measurable. We prove the proposition by showing that D includes all measur-
able sets.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 59









V 0 ⊂∆Ω,VG ⊂K AG
−i are measurable
and VG =K AG
−ifor allG / ∈Γ
)
.
Note that C is an algebra (closed under taking complements, ﬁnite intersections and
unions) and generates the product topology and hence the σ-algebra on ∆Ω×R−i. We
ﬁrst show that C ⊂D.
Consider any element V ∈ C for which Γ = {G} is a singleton. If we can show that
{ri : marg∆Ω×K AG
−i µR
i (ri)(V 0 × VG) ∈ I} is a measurable set of rules for every interval
I ⊂ [0,1], it will follow that V ∈ D. Since {µ ∈ ∆(∆Ω × K AG
−i) : µ(V 0 × VG) ∈ I} is a
measurable set, it sufﬁces to show that marg∆Ω×K AG
−i µR
i : Ri → ∆(∆Ω × K AG
−i) is a
measurable mapping.
By Lemma 50 there is a base for the Borel σ-algebra on ∆Ω×K AG
−i consisting of sets
of the form
W f ={µ:µ[f ]<0}
for all functions f ∈ L G. In the course of the proof of Theorem 3, we showed that for
any f G ∈ F G and s ∈ R, there is a game ˜ G and a closed subset of actions ˜ A ∈ A−i such




































By Lemma 10, the ﬁrst set is measurable. Now since f = f G
1 − f G
2 for some f G















































is measurable as countable union of ﬁnite intersections of measurable sets. Therefore
the inverse image of every set in a base for the sigma-algebra is measurable and this
implies that marg∆Ω×K AG
−i µR
i is measurable. (See Aliprantis and Border (1994, Lemma
8.16).) NowconsideranelementV ∈C forwhichΓisanarbitraryﬁniteset. Considerthe60 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
product game ˜ G =
Q
ΓG, where the product set V
˜ G =
Q
G∈ΓVG is a measurable subset
of K A
˜ G
−i. By the product structure, for any rationalizable rule r−i( ˜ G) =
Q
G∈Γr−i(G).
Thus if we deﬁne V 0 = V 0 ×V
˜ G ×
Q
G / ∈ΓK AG0
−i, we have 1V 0 = 1V, and we have already
shown that V 0 belongs to D.
We have shown C ⊂ D. Now consider any sequence of measurable subsets En ⊂
∆Ω×R−i such that En ⊂ En+1, E ∈D, and let E =∪En. The sequence of indicator func-
tions 1En increases pointwise to 1E. By countable additivity, µR
i (ri)(E)=limµR
i (ri)(En),














which is measurable. Thus E ∈ D and D is a monotone class that includes the algebra
C. By the monotone class lemma, D includes all Borel sets. 
D. PROOF OF LEMMA 6
PROOF. We begin with a simple observation: For any belief-preserving type mapping
ψ : S → T, S,T ∈ Tw (X), for any type si ∈ Si, and for any measurable subsets B,C ⊆






















The ﬁrst is just the deﬁnition of a belief-preserving type mapping, while the second is a
consequence of the ﬁrst.
Part 1. Suppose that φ∆ :S → T preserves beliefs. For any (si,τi) ∈Si ×∆Ω, deﬁne




































where the third equality comes from the observation above and the fact that φ∆ pre-
serves beliefs. We verify immediately that φ satisﬁes (3) and (4).
Part 2. If φ preserves conditional beliefs, then there is for any (si,τi) ∈ S × ∆Ω a
measurable mapping φ(si,τi) :S−i ×∆Ω→T−i ×∆Ω such that equations (2), (3), (4) hold.Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 61
Equation (4) and the deﬁnition of beliefs in the type space T × ∆Ω imply that
proj∆Ωφ(si,τi)(s−i,τ−i)=τ−i. The deﬁnition of beliefs in the space T ×∆Ω together with
theassumptionthatdifferenttypesinT havedifferentbeliefsimplythatprojT ◦φ(si,τi) =
projT ◦φ.
These two facts taken together lead us to the conclusion that the mapping φ(si,τi)















(s−i,τ−i)=: ˆ φ−i (s−i,τ−i).
It is immediate to see that the type mapping ˆ φ :S ×∆Ω→T ×∆Ω preserves conditional
beliefswithadualequaltoitself, ˆ φi = ˆ φ(si,τi) forany(si,τi). Astraightforwardargument
shows that ˆ φ preserves beliefs.














































and φ∆ preserves beliefs (the third equality comes from the second observation above).

E. UPPER HEMICONTINUITY OF THE RATIONALIZABLE CORRESPONDENCE
This appendix contains the proof of Proposition 3. The proof builds on two lemmas.
LEMMA 11. If T is ∆-continuous andG is a compact, continuous game, thenUi(ai,σ∆
−i |
ti) is jointly continuous in (ai,σ∆
−i,ti).
PROOF. First we show that πi is jointly continuous. Pick M > sup|ui(a,ω)| (recall that
we assume that ui is bounded for this class of games.) Let (ak,t k) → (a∞,t ∞) ∈ A ×T.
The set {t k}∞
k=1 is compact, and so by ∆-continuity, the corresponding family of mea-
sures {βi(t k)} ⊂ ∆Ω is also compact. Because Ω is a Polish space, the family is tight,
i.e. for every " > 0, there exists a compact K " ⊂ Ω such that βi(t k)(K ") > 1 − " for all
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is jointly continuous as well. 
LEMMA 12. Suppose T is a continuous type space and let Si ⊂ Ti be a compact subset of
types and B ⊂A−i ×T−i is a closed assessment. Then the correspondence
Σ∆(B |·):Si ⇒∆(T−i ×A−i)
has compact graph.
PROOF. The proof uses the following result (see Aliprantis and Border (1994, Theorem
12.20)): If X is a Polish space, then a family F ⊂ ∆(X) has compact closure if and only





−i ) be a sequence from the graph. Since Si is assumed compact, t k
i
has a subsequence converging to some ti ∈ Si. Now pick " > 0. Since Si is com-
pact, by the continuity of T so is µT
i (Si) = {µT
i (ti) : ti ∈ Si} and by the continuity of
marginals, so is margT−i µT
i (Si). By the above result, there is a compact K ⊂T−i such that
margT−i µT
i (ti)(K)>1−" for all ti ∈Si. Thus for any ti ∈Si and σ∆
−i ∈Σ∆(B |ti), we have
σ
∆,ti
−i (K ×A−i)=margT−i µT
i (ti)(K)>1−". Since K ×A−i is compact, this shows that the
family [
ti∈Si
Σ∆(B |ti)Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) Hierarchies of belief 63
is tight and therefore has compact closure.
Because σ
∆,k




−i. The proof is concluded by showing that σ∆
−i ∈Σ∆(B |ti).
1. By deﬁnition, margT−i σ
∆,l
−i = margT−i µT
i (t l
i ). Because the mapping T is contin-
uous, margT−i µT
i (t l
i ) → margT−i µT
i (ti) and since margT−i σ
∆,l





2. The set of measures assigning probability 1 to a given closed set is closed. Since
σ
∆,l
−i (B)=1 for all l, we have σ∆
−i(B)=1 as well. 
Forthenextresult, weneedtodeﬁneaprocedureofiterativeeliminationofnot-best
responses. For any gameG and any type space T deﬁne inductively assessments:
R
G,T









PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3. We start by showing inductively that each R
G,T
n,i is a closed
correspondence. It is obviously true for n = 0. Suppose now it is true for some arbitrary
n, and let (t k
i ,ak
i ) → (ti,ai) with (t k
i ,ak
i ) ∈ R
G,T






i ) such that ak
i is a best response of t k
i against σ
∆,k
−i . By Lemma 12,
there is a subsequence σ
∆,l


















i is a best response of t l
i against σ
∆,l
−i for all l implies that ai is a best response
of ti against σ∆
−i. We have shown that (ti,ai)∈R
G,T
n,i and hence that the latter is closed.
The ﬁrst step implies that the correspondence R
G,T
i is closed as an intersection of




i . Because R
G,T
i has the ﬁxed-point




k,i for every k, hence R
G,T
i is contained in R
G,T
i . To show
equality, therefore, it sufﬁces to show that R
G,T
i also has the ﬁxed-point property and is
therefore a subset of R
G,T
i . We need to show
R
G,T
i ={(ti,ai):ai ∈ B(RG,T |ti)}.
Suppose ai is a best response of ti against σ∆




for every k and hence (ti,ai)∈R
G,T
k,i for every k. This shows that (ti,ai)∈R
G,T
i .
Suppose (ti,ai) ∈ R
G,T
i , i.e. (ti,ai) ∈ R
G,T





k | ti) such that ai is a best response of ti against σ
∆,k
−i . Since R
G,T
i is




tion of the continuity argument above shows that ai is a best response of ti against σ∆
−i.
In order to conclude that (ti,ai) is a best response to some conjecture from Σ∆(RG,T |64 Ely and P˛ eski Theoretical Economics 1 (2006)
ti), it is enough to check that σ∆
−i ∈Σ∆(RG,T |ti). Notice however that this is immediate


































k(l ) | ti) for some k (l ): for








k(l ),i)=1. This ends the proof. 
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